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International
Along: Should
Permitted to
Week in the
Hunter?

Bounty Hunter RideU.K. Thrill Seekers Be
Pay to Experience a
Life of a U.S. Bounty
ABSTRACT

This Note explores the internationalimplications of a plan
proposed by two bounty hunters in the Tacoma, Washington
area to charge U.K. thrill seekers to accompany them on
manhunts in the United States. PartH explains the differences
in Colonial American society that resulted in the early
development of a commercial bail bond system to replace the
Part III examines the
English personal surety system.
contractual relationship between a bail bondsman and a
defendant, as well as the agency relationship between a bail
bondsman and a bounty hunter, to show why bounty hunters
have such unbridled power to arrestfugitives. This section also
explains why bounty hunters are not regarded as state actors
subject to constitutional restraints and describes the modern
commercial bail bond industry in the United States. Part IV
discusses the limitations on the ability of U.S. bounty hunters to
exercise their arrestpowers outside of the United States. Part V
details the plan of two bounty hunters in the Tacoma,
Washington area-one of whom was a U.K citizen-to charge
U.K tourists to accompany them on bounty hunting missions.
Finally, Part VI addresses whether U.S. citizenship ought to be
a prerequisiteto being a U.S. bounty hunter.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States is the only country that uses private bounty
hunters to track down defendants who skip bail. 1 In 1998, two

bounty hunters in Washington state concocted a plan to capitalize on
this unique feature of the U.S. criminal justice system by charging
U.K. tourists to experience firsthand a week in the life of a U.S.
bounty hunter. 2 Because of bad publicity, the bounty hunters did not
carry through with this plan,3 but the possibility remains open that
other enterprising bounty hunters will institute such a ride-along
scheme for foreign tourists who are fascinated by the Wild West
image of the U.S. bounty hunter.
4
Bounty hunters in the United States are virtually unregulated.
They have police-like powers, but are not subject to mandatory
training or licensing requirements. 5 More importantly, the law does
not consider them to be state actors, so they are not subject to
constitutional restrictions. 6 This Note considers the ability of nonU.S. citizens to participate in a scheme similar to the one proposed by
the Washington state bounty hunters and concludes that lack of
regulation would permit citizens of other countries to act as bounty
hunters in such a scheme.
Part II examines the factors that influenced the development of
The
the commercial bail bond system in the United States.
commercial bail bond system developed in Colonial America as an
adaptation of the English personal surety system for release pending
trial. 7 Such an adaptation was necessary because Colonial American
society was far more mobile than English society. 8
Part III analyzes the scope of a bounty hunter's power to arrest
fugitives. Taylor v. Taintor, a nineteenth century U.S. Supreme
Court decision, gave bounty hunters the power to use any reasonable
means necessary to recapture defendants who skip bail, including

Sasha Abramsky, A Deadly Game of Cat and Mouse, INDEP. (London), Mar.
1.
1, 1998, at 10 (referring to bounty hunting as "a uniquely American form of
employment" and noting that in other countries that grant bail to defendants "it is the
role of the police to haul in skippers").
Neil Modie, All Bets Are Off in Manhunts-for-Tourists Scheme, SEATTLE
2.
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 25, 1998, at B1 [hereinafter Modie, All Bets Are Of/].
3.
Id.
Jonathan Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man." The Rights and Duties of
4.
Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 HOuS. L. REV. 731, 77375 (1996).
See discussion infra Part III.B.
5.
6.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See discussion infra Part lI.B.
7.
8.
See id.

956
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breaking and entering into the home of the defendant. 9 Part III also
explains the modern commercial bail bond industry and why courts
have declined to treat bounty hunters as state actors subject to
constitutional restraints.
Part IV discusses the limitations on the ability of U.S. bounty
hunters to exercise their arrest powers outside of the United States.
Reese v. United States prohibits bail bondsmen and their bounty
hunters from arresting defendants who flee to another country. 10
Reese, however, is substantially undercut by the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,
which permits courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who are
abducted in violation of Reese. 11 Part IV also addresses the issue of
U.S. treaties that may nullify or reduce the impact of the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine.
Part V introduces the reader to two bounty hunters in
Washington and outlines their plan to charge U.K. tourists to
accompany them on bounty hunting missions. The bounty hunters
abandoned their ride-along vacation plan because of bad publicitysome of which resulted from the discovery that one of the pair had
served two years in prison in the United Kingdom. 12 If the concept
can withstand legal scrutiny, however, other bounty hunters may
decide to supplement their income by charging international tourists
to tag along with them on manhunts. Part VI concludes that the
principles of Taylor v. Taintor are broad enough to allow citizens of
other countries to legally act as bounty hunters in the United States,
but suggests that this scenario would create additional regulatory
obstacles that are not at issue when states regulate bounty hunters
who are U.S. citizens.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMERCIAL BAIL SYSTEM
U.K. commentators are fascinated by the unique U.S. tradition of
using private bounty hunters to track down bail jumpers. 13 Many
suggest that U.S. citizens are still caught up in the Wild West
mentality of yesteryear and depict bounty hunters as gunslingers
14
tracking down criminals from "Wanted: Dead or Alive" posters.
These commentators fail to recognize that the modern U.S. bail
system has its roots in the English common law. The development of

9.
Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371 (1872).
10.
Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. 13, 21-22 (1869).
11.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
Modie, All Bets Are Off, supra note 2.
12.
13.
See, e.g., MPs Condemn 'Wyatt Earp" Tours Hunting Fugitives from U.S.
Justice, BIRMINGHAM POST, Feb. 3, 1998, at 8 [hereinafter MPs Condemn].
14.
Id. (quoting a U.K. MP who referred to bounty hunters as "latter-day Wyatt
Earps and Bat Mastersons").
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a commercial bail bond system and the use of private bounty hunters
resulted from the necessary adaptations of the English personal
surety system to an increasingly mobile society that inhabited a vast,
undeveloped country with no apparent boundaries. 15 The commercial
bail bond system that replaced the English personal surety system
required bondsmen to employ bounty hunters to recapture bail
skippers.
A. PretrialRelease in Medieval England

The exact origins of the modern practice of release on bail
pending trial are not certain, but the practice clearly predates the
Norman invasion of England. 16 Some scholars have speculated that
the origins of the modern bail system can be traced back to the
ancient English practice of hostageship. 17 Hostageship was a war
tactic developed by Germanic Angles and Saxons in England in which
a hostage was held until the fulfillment of a promise or the occurrence
of a desired consequence.' 8 Under this system, a person, called a
hostage-surety, was chosen to assume personal responsibility for the
hostage. This person "placed his body in a state of metaphorical
hostageship."'19 Some historical evidence suggests that the hostagesurety would actually be required to suffer the punishment intended
for the prisoner if the prisoner escaped.2 0 It is more likely, however,
that the hostage-surety protected the debtor from punishment by
assuming his debt, and the debtor then became indebted to the
surety.

21

See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 748-49; John A. Chamberlin, Note, Bounty
15.
Hunters: Can the Criminal Justice System Live Without Them?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV
1175, 1180-81.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1178 (explaining that the uncertainty exists
16.
because "the notion of bail predates written English law"); RONALD GOLDFARB,

RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 21 (1965) (noting that another
reason for the uncertainty is "historical inattention"); see also Drimmer, supra note 4,
at 744.
GOLDFARB, supra note 16, at 21-22.
17.
Id. at 22.
18.
19.
Id.
Id.
20.
Id. Goldfarb explains the similarities between hostageship and the modern
21.
bail system as follows:
Both the old hostage and the modern surety assume responsibility for another,
one by pledging his body, the other by pledging his material wealth. The
classic condition of suretyship existed in the hostage relationship; that is, if the
debtor failed to reimburse the creditor, the surety became responsible to the
creditor .... Today's surety is responsible only for property liability and not
bodily seizure. Money has replaced men. Liability for the responsibility of
another is the common characteristic of both relationships.
Id. at 22-23.
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Another theory traces the origins of the modern bail system to
the early English concept of wergeld.22 Under the ancient system of
wergeld, someone who allegedly committed a wrong against another
person was required "to guarantee a payment to reimburse that
wrong, should he later be found at fault."23 The person who allegedly
committed the wrong could find a surety, who would assure the
24
victim that the accused would pay his wergeld if fault were found.
If, upon an adverse judgment, the accused failed to pay his wergeld,
the surety would be obligated to pay the wergeld in his stead.2 5 The
victim was guaranteed compensation for his injuries if the accused
was found to be at fault, thus discouraging victims from seeking
26
private vengeance.
By the thirteenth century, England had developed a personal
surety system for pretrial release that would be the model for the
modern U.S. system of bail. 27 Because magistrates did not sit in a
particular place, but instead traveled from county to county
conducting trials, it was common for many months, or even years, to
pass between arrest and trial. 28 To prevent prolonged detention of
suspects pending trial, local sheriffs would often release suspects into
the custody of a trustworthy member of the community, referred to as
the defendant's surety. 29 At first, the surety was required to be a
blood relative of the accused, but eventually sureties were permitted
30
to be friends or acquaintances of the accused.
In the early days of pretrial release, the surety was "literally
In other words, if the defendant failed to
bound body for body."3'
appear for trial, the surety was obligated to endure the punishment
that the defendant was intended to suffer.3 2 This practice eventually
evolved into one in which, instead of agreeing to suffer the
defendant's punishment, the surety agreed to pay a certain sum if the
33
accused did not appear, usually by forfeiture of land.
Under English common law, the state's custody of an accused did
not end when he was delivered to the surety.3 4 Instead, the surety
35
acted as proxy for the state until the defendant's trial began.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 744-45.
Id; see also Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1179.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 745; Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1179.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1179.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 744.
Id.
Id. at 745.

34.

Id.

35.
Id. "Bail, as a form of continued detention, was commonly referred to as
'the Duke's living prison."' Id. at 745-46.
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Because custody was treated as a single, continuous event, the surety
had authority to imprison the accused at any time, even if he had not
yet failed to appear for trial. 36 Also, the surety had the same legal
duty as the sheriff to recapture the accused if he fled. 37 It was rare
for the accused to flee, however, because the penalty for flight
included banishment and confiscation of any land that he owned. 38
The risk of flight was further reduced because most town sheriffs
personally knew the defendants they released and were in a good
39
position to accurately judge trustworthiness and risk of flight.
B. Adapting the English PersonalSurety System to ColonialAmerica
Exact duplication of the English model of pretrial release was
not possible in Colonial America. 40 There were many differences
between eighteenth century England and Colonial America that
resulted in the development of the U.S. commercial bail bond system
to replace the system that worked so well in England. 41 "Eighteenth
century England . . .was a homogenous, property-oriented nation
with limited mobility." 42 For the most part, people lived in small
towns and knew each other well.43 This familiarity created incentives
44
for pretrial release that were not duplicated in Colonial America.
Local English sheriffs usually had the advantage of knowing both the
defendant and the potential surety, 45 and were therefore willing to
release defendants into the custody of sureties. 46 Sureties were
willing to risk forfeiture of property because they were acquainted
with the defendants released into their custody and could accurately
47
evaluate the potential risk of flight.
Also important was the fact that English citizens tended to stay
in one place for most of their lives. 48 English citizens were deeply
rooted in their communities and rarely traveled. 49 England's size and

36.
See id. at 746.
37.
Id.
38.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1180. Confiscation of land was a significant
deterrent to flight because "[p]roperty ownership in England during Medieval times
included not only ownership rights, but also rights and privileges in society generally.
Those who were not fortunate enough to own property were considered the lowest class
of society." Id.
39.
Id.
40.
See id. at 1180-81; Drimmer, supra note 4, at 748-49.
41.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 748-49; Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1180-81.
42.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 748.
43.
Id.
44.
See id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1181.
48.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 748.
49.
See id. at 748-49.

960
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property-oriented social structure made it unlikely that defendants
would flee before trial. 50 Because England was a well-developed
island, defendants had few places to which they could escape. 51 They
were also tied to their land as the source and symbol of their social
52
position.
The characteristics of English society that made the surety
system possible did not carry over to Colonial America. Unlike
England, Colonial America was a continent, with an "unexplored and
seemingly endless frontier." 53 Although the first settlers established
small towns and used a personal surety system similar to the one
used in England, wanderlust eventually took hold and a personal
surety system became unworkable. 54 As the nation expanded and
people from towns ventured into the unexplored frontier, "the
populace increasingly came to lack longstanding roots or deep
community relationships." 55 Land was not a scarce status resource as
it was in England; 56 instead, people were wanderers who were not
57
tied to any one place for long.
Mobility led to the disappearance of the familiarity that had
existed in English towns. 58 This environment made it difficult for
defendants to find sureties the courts knew and considered
trustworthy. 59 Also, because defendants did not have family and
friends in the community, it was difficult for them to find people
60
willing to act as sureties for them.
Even if defendants did have people in the community with whom
they were well acquainted, those people were often unwilling to act as
sureties because the risk of flight was too great. 61 Defendants were
not rooted in the community, and there was a vast frontier into which
they could escape. 62 People were unwilling to risk forfeiture of land
when the vast frontier that made it likely that defendants would flee
also made it extremely unlikely they could be tracked down. 63 For

50.
See Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1180-81.
51.
Id.
52.
See id.
53.
Id. at 1181.
54.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 748-49.
55.
Id. at 749.
56.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1180-81.
57.
See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 749.
58.
See id; see also Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1181 (explaining that
"[b]ecause the United States was a new nation, citizens often did not know each
other").
59.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 749.
60.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1181.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. Also, "[C]olonial punishments for conviction were often harsh, so that
flight to another part of the country was an inviting alternative." Id.
63.
Id.
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pretrial release to be effective in Colonial America, a new system had
to be invented.
64
The new system that emerged was a commercial bond system.
Despite the difficulty in finding acceptable sureties, pretrial release
was still necessary to avoid excessive pretrial detention and prison
overcrowding. 65 To solve these problems, U.S. courts developed a
66
If
system that allowed defendants to pay for their pretrial release.
the defendant failed to appear for trial, he would forfeit the sum he
67
paid.
The development of a system of release on bail presented a
lucrative opportunity for entrepreneurs willing to take a risk. 68
These entrepreneurs came to be known as commercial bail bondsmen.
Many defendants could not afford to pay the full bail amount required
for their pretrial release, but they could afford to pay a fee to a bail
69
bondsman, who then agreed to pay the full amount to the court.
Bail was regarded as a continuation of the defendant's
incarceration. 70 Like the personal surety, the bail bondsman acted as
a proxy for the state to guarantee the defendant's appearance at
trial. 71 The bail bondsman had the authority to recapture the
defendant at any time. 72 If the defendant did not appear at trial, the
money that the bail bondsman paid for the defendant's pretrial
73
release would not be returned to him.
As mentioned earlier, there was little incentive for defendants to
remain in the community and the nation's rapid expansion made it
increasingly easy for defendants to flee before trial.74 To combat
these changes, bondsmen began to rely on the assistance of bounty
hunters to track down defendants who skipped bail. 75 Bounty
hunters were regarded as agents of the bondsman and therefore had
the same legal authority to recapture the defendant as the
76
bondsman.

64.
65.

Id.; see also Drimmer, supra note 4, at 749.
See Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1181.

66.

See id.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 749.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1181.
Id. at 1180-81.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 750.
Id.
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THE SCOPE OF THE BOUNTY HUNTER'S POWER

Bounty hunters are authorized to use all reasonable forceincluding deadly force-to recapture bail jumpers. 77 Bounty hunters
act as agents for bail bondsmen who delegate their contractual power
to re-arrest fugitives to the bounty hunters. 78 Because bounty
hunters are enforcing the contract between the fugitive and the
bondsman, they are not regarded as state actors subject to
79
constitutional restrictions.
A. Early Cases Authorizing the Use of Bounty Hunters
Two early cases-Nicolls v. Ingersoll and Taylor v. Taintor-set
the parameters for bounty hunter action.80 These cases authorized
bounty hunters to use all reasonable force necessary to recapture bail
jumpers.8 1 They also allowed bounty hunters to cross state lines to
8 2
pursue fleeing fugitives and even to break down doors.
1. Nicolls v. Ingersoll
One of the most influential cases authorizing the use of bounty
hunters and defining the scope of their powers was Nicolls u.
Ingersoll, decided by the New York Supreme Court of Judicature in
1810.83 The case involved a civil suit against two bounty hunters for
trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment.8 4 After being
arrested in New Haven, Connecticut and released on bail, which was
paid by a commercial bondsman named Edwards, Nicolls returned to
his home in New York. 85 To protect his security, Edwards hired two
bounty hunters, Ingersoll and Morgan, to arrest Nicolls and bring
8 6
him back to New Haven before he was scheduled to appear in court.
The bounty hunters went to Nicolls' home around midnight and
demanded entry.8 7 After they were refused, the bounty hunters broke
into Nicolls' residence and seized him "with great roughness."8 8

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872).
Id. at 371.
Id.
See id.; Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
Id.
Id. at 154, 156.
Id. at 145.

84.

Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nicolls filed a civil suit against the bounty hunters for trespass,
assault and battery, and false imprisonment. 89 The jury found in
favor of the bounty hunters on the issues presented, finding that the
bounty hunters had made a demand to be admitted before breaking
the door and that no "undue and unnecessary force had been made
use of in attempting to make the surrender." 90 On appeal, Nicolls
argued that bondsmen could not legally delegate their recapture
powers to bounty hunters, that the recapture powers could not be
exercised in another state, and that the bounty hunters used
excessive force by breaking into his house. 91
The court first addressed the issue of whether a bondsman could
92
delegate his authority to recapture a defendant to bounty hunters.
Because "the law recognizes the act of an authorized agent as equal to
that of the principal," the court held that a bondsman may delegate
his contractual recapture powers over a defendant to bounty
hunters. 93 The court then held that a bondsman and his agents have
the authority to recapture a defendant in another state and to return
him to the state where he was arrested. 94 The bail bondsman may
recapture the defendant at any time and in any place because the law
considers the defendant to be a prisoner of the bondsman. 95 The
96
If
defendant has his liberty only because the bondsman allows it.
the bondsman chooses to re-arrest, he can do so at any time and in
any place-just as a sheriff can enter another state to pursue an
97
escaped prisoner, so can the bondsman or his agents.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of the appropriate amount
of force that could be used to recapture a defendant. 98 The court
explained "that the law considers the [bailee] as a prisoner, whose jail
liberties are enlarged or circumscribed, at the will of [the
bondsman]." 9 9 The court held that bondsmen and their agents could
recapture a defendant at any time, "even on a Sunday."'10 0 Bondsmen
and their bounty hunter agents even have the authority to break
down the door of the defendant's home to recapture him because their
"power is analogous to that of the sheriff, who may break open an
'1 1
outer door to take a prisoner, who has escaped from arrest."

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 155-56.
Id.

97.

Id.

98.
99.
100.
101.

See id. at 155.
Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156.
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2. Taylor v. Taintor
The U.S. Supreme Court expanded on the New York Supreme
Court of Judicature's analysis in Nicolls v. Ingersoll more than sixty
years later in the landmark case of Taylor v. Taintor.10 2 Taylor v.
Taintor is credited with giving bondsmen and bounty hunters the
extensive powers that they currently possess. 10 3 It has been criticized
10 4
often, but never overruled.
In Taylor v. Taintor, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether a bail bondsman should be required to forfeit the bail he paid
for a defendant's release if the defendant was unable to appear for
trial because a second state delivered him into the custody of a third
state. 10 5 McGuire was arrested in Connecticut for grand larceny.10 6
10 7
He was released on $8,000 bail paid by Taylor and Allen.
Following his release, McGuire went home to New York.' 0 8 While
McGuire was in New York, the governor of Maine asked the governor
of New York to arrest McGuire and to deliver him to Maine to be tried
for a burglary that he had allegedly committed in that state. 10 9 The
governor of New York was unaware that McGuire had been released
on bail pending trial in Connecticut, so he complied with Maine's
McGuire was unable to attend his scheduled. court
request. 110
appearance in Connecticut because he was incarcerated in Maine."'
Taylor and Allen forfeited their bail payment because McGuire did
1 12
not appear before the Connecticut court at the appropriate time.
They sued to recover this money because the arrest and transfer of
McGuire from New York to Maine, ordered by the governor of New
1i
York, was beyond their control' 1
In reaching its decision, it was necessary for the Court to
summarize and approve the common law rules regarding bail
bondsmen and bounty hunters:
When bail is given, .the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody
of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original

102.
See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1872).
See generally Maj. Christopher M. Supernor, InternationalBounty Hunters
103.
for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice, 50 A.F. L. REV. 215, 232
(2001).
104. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 910 P.2d 164 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Grun v. State,
829 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Johnson v. County of Kittitas, 11 P.3d 862
(Wash. App. Div. 2000).
105.
Taylor, 83 U.S. at 368.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111.
Id. at 368-69.
112.
Id. at 369.
113.
Id.
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imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and
deliver him up in their discharge; and if that cannot be done at once,
they may imprison him at once. They may exercise their rights in
person or by agent. They may pursue him into another State; may
arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his
house for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new
process. None is needed. It is likened to the rearrestby the sheriff of an
escapingprisoner.... They may doubtless permit him to go beyond the
limits of the State within which he is to answer, but it is unwise and
imprudent to do so; and if any evil ensue, they must bear the burden of
1 14
the consequences, and cannot cast them upon the obligee.

Taylor and Allen could not recover their bail payment because
"bail will [only] be exonerated where the performance of the condition
is rendered impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the
act of the law. 11 5 This case did not fall within the act of the law
exception because McGuire's act of committing a crime in Maine, not
the act of the New York governor, caused his appearance in
Connecticut to be impossible. 116
Under the common law, Taylor and Allen could have prevented
McGuire from leaving Connecticut. 117 When McGuire went to New
York, he was still considered to be in the custody of the state of
Connecticut through his bail bondsmen. 118 As sureties, Taylor and
Allen had the authority to enter New York to seize McGuire at any
time prior to his trial in Connecticut or to send bounty hunters to do
the same. 1 19 They could also have notified the governor of New York
120
If
that McGuire was released on bail pending trial in Connecticut.
Taylor and Allen had done so, the governor of New York may have
recognized the conflict and delivered McGuire into their custody
121
instead of Maine's.
B. The Modern Bail Industry in the United States
Today, bail bonding is a big business in the United States. The
bail industry generates more than $4 billion in revenue each year,
netting more than $400 million in profit. 12 2 Bail bonding is also a
risky business. Approximately fourteen percent of defendants who
are released into the custody of bail bondsmen fail to appear for
123
trial.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 371-72 (emphasis added).
Id. at 369.
Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id. at 371-73.
See id. at 373.
See id.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1188.
Id. at 1189.
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Bail is generally available to all defendants, unless they are
charged with a capital crime. 124 The Eighth Amendment guarantees
that bail shall not be excessive. 125 Magistrates generally determine
126
the amount of bail based on the defendant's risk of flight.
Defendants who cannot afford to pay for their own release can hire a
bail bondsman to post a bail bond for them-assuming they can
afford to pay the bondsman's fee, which is usually ten percent of the
full bail amount. 127 Bail bondsmen have complete discretion in
determining for which defendants they are willing to act as
sureties, 128 but the industry is extremely competitive and profit
margins are slim, so bondsmen sometimes post bonds for defendants
who pose a serious risk of flight. 129 When the defendant is released
pending trial, the bondsman pays a percentage of the bail amount,
usually ten percent, to the court. 130 This money will be returned to
3
him if the defendant appears for trial.' '
If the defendant does not appear for trial, the bondsman becomes
liable for the full amount. 132
Typically, bail bondsmen have
agreements with insurance companies that pay the full bail amount if
133
the defendant fails to appear for trial and cannot be tracked down.
Despite insurance, bondsmen still have incentive to track down
defendants who flee because insurance companies will no longer
underwrite their bonds if they consistently fail to secure the
134
appearance of more than two percent of their clients.

124.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 761.
125.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required... ").
126.
NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POSTINVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, CASES AND MATERIALS 91 (2d ed. 2000).
127.
Holly J. Joiner, Note, Private Police: Defending the Power of Professional
Bail Bondsmen, 32 IND. L. REV. 1413, 1417 (1999) (noting that "this fee is
nonrefundable so it cannot provide a financial incentive [for the defendant] to return").
128.
Id. The absolute discretion of bondsmen has been criticized by Judge J.
Skelly Wright:
[T]he professional bondsmen hold the keys to the jail in their pockets. They
determine for whom they will act as surety-who in their judgment is a good
risk. The bad risks, in the bondsman's judgment, and the ones who are unable
to pay the bondsmen's fee, remain in jail. The court . . . [is] relegated to the
relatively unimportant chore of fixing the amount of bail.
Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., concurring).
129.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1189.
130.
Andrew D. Patrick, Note, Running from the Law: Should Bounty Hunters
Be Considered State Actors and Thus Subject to ConstitutionalRestraints?,52 VAND. L.
REV. 171, 175 (1999).
131.
Id.
132.
Id. Failing to appear for trial is known as "skipping" or "jumping" bail, and
a defendant who does so is known as a bail "jumper" or a bail "skipper." Id.
133.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1188.
134.
Id. at 1189.
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When a defendant fails to appear, the court will issue a bench
warrant for the return of the accused.' 3 5 The bondsman cannot rely
on the successful return of the defendant by the government,
however, because the volume of outstanding bench warrants far
exceeds the government's resources. 136 If the defendant is not found
within a certain number of days, the bondsman becomes liable for the
full bail amount. 13 7 The bondsman cannot leave his business to track
down each defendant on his own, so employing bounty hunters to
track down missing defendants makes good business sense.13 8 Bail
bondsmen usually pay bounty hunters a fee equal to ten percent of
39
the bond amount if a fugitive is recovered successfully.1
Due to the increasing costs of the criminal justice system, the
recent trend is for the state and federal governments to rely on the
private sector to carry out many public sector functions. 140 This
trend is evident in the bail bond industry. Increased costs of
maintaining detention facilities and overcrowding have led to a
greater preference for release on bail. 141 In an effort to reduce prison
overcrowding and to cut the costs of pretrial detention, the
government has, in effect, delegated the public function of jailing
defendants whose trials are pending to bail bondsmen and bounty
142
hunters.
In terms of efficiency, the reliance on bail bondsmen and bounty
hunters is sound policy. Most defendants released on bail will not
For those who do, the estimated 99.2%
flee the jurisdiction.
successful recapture rate for bounty hunters is significantly higher
143
than the recapture rate for police.
The problem with the trend toward privatization in pretrial
detention is that bounty hunters are generally unregulated. One
reason bounty hunters are more successful than police at recapturing
defendants is that they are not subject to the same constitutional
Bounty hunters are allowed to use any force
restrictions. 144
reasonably necessary, including deadly force, to apprehend their
targets, thus creating the potential for infliction of serious physical
harm on defendants. 145 Even bounty hunters who use more force
146
Civil
than is reasonably necessary are unlikely to be prosecuted.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1189-90.
Id.
Patrick, supra note 130, at 175.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 759-60.
Id. at 760.
Id.
Id. at 762.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1192.

146

Id. at 1193.
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typically do
suits are not an attractive option because bounty hunters
147
not have enough assets to make these suits worthwhile.
The potential for abuse is augmented by the fact that most states
do not have any licensing or training requirements for bounty

hunters. 148 For the most part, anyone who can find a bail bondsman
With few
willing to pay them can become a bounty hunter. 149
150
exceptions, any screening of bounty hunters falls to the bondsman.
This creates "an ominous problem" because the bondsman's interests
may conflict with the interests of society. 151 In selecting bounty
hunters, the bondsman is motivated exclusively by financial
concerns. 15 2 If a bounty hunter has an exceptional success rate for
recapturing defendants, the bondsman will earn significant profits
and may overlook a bounty hunter's abusive practices. 153 In most
states, the total lack of regulation means that even a criminal record
will not prevent an individual from becoming a bounty hunter. 154

Id.
147.
148.
Id. at 1190. "In most states, the job requires no qualifications, no training,
and no license of any sort. It seems that the only requirement to enter the profession is
Bondsmen, on the other hand, are subject to licensing
self-proclamation."
requirements in most states. Drimmer, supra note 4, at 771; see also Neil Modie,
Bounty Hunters Have Carte Blanche in Pursuits; False Arrest Among Consequences,
TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Apr. 19, 1998, at A17 (noting that "[blail agents in Washington must
be trained, bonded and licensed and have no criminal records"). A number of states
have decided to institute stricter regulations on bounty hunters. See, e.g., Dermot
Purgavie, He Came in Search of Bounty (But He Ended Up Behind Bars), GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 28, 1997, at 5 (explaining that to get a license to be a bounty hunter in
Nevada, one "must be at least 21, with no felonies or drug offenses on their record,
must be screened for drugs, prove their mental fitness and take a minimum of 80 hours
of training in courses ranging from constitutional law to arrest procedures"); see also
Dan Synge, Connected: DIY Hunting with Mice; The Wild West Image of the Bounty
Hunter Has Given Way to that of a 4x4 Driver with a Website, But the Perils Are the
Same, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 13, 1998, at 6 (noting that Illinois, Kentucky,
and Oregon have made bounty hunting illegal).
149.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1193-94. For novice bounty hunters, finding
a bondsman to work for may prove to be a difficult task because most bondsman "will
deal only with reputable bounty hunters." Synge, supra note 148. But novice bounty
hunters may get their start by latching onto or tagging along with a successful,
reputable bounty hunter. See discussion infra Part V (pointing out that Washington
bounty hunter Ted Oliver allowed curious friends to tag along with him when he
chased fugitives and that Oliver got his start by doing the same thing).
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1193-94.
150.
151.
Id. at 1194.
152.
Id.
Id. The problem may not be as "ominous" as it seems, however, because
153.
many bondsmen, who recognize that the abusive reputation of the bounty hunting
profession is bad for business, actually support the movement to regulate bounty
hunters. Id. at 1188.
According to Arizona prosecutor Richard Romley, "[Bounty hunters] are
154.
We have no regulations at all. Any ex-con who is out
America's dirty little secret ....
of prison for murder can become a bounty hunter." Purgavie, supra note 148; see also
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 772 (speculating that many bounty hunters are indeed ex-
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C. The ContractualRelationship: Why Bounty Hunters Are Not State
Actors
Even though courts have justified giving bounty hunters policelike arrest powers by analogizing them to a police officer in pursuit of
a fleeing suspect, this same analogy has not carried over to impose
equal restrictions. 15 5 Instead, most courts have held that the
Constitution's restrictions on police conduct do not apply to bounty
hunters because they are not state actors. 156 Their authority to
arrest a defendant is based on the contract between the defendant
and the bondsman rather than on a court order. 157 By assenting to
the bail contract, the defendant agrees to be subject to seizure by the
158
bail bondsman or his agents at any time.
Because the bondsman's authority to arrest the defendant is
based on the bail contract rather than on court order, the Fourth
Amendment does not protect the defendant from unreasonable
searches and seizures by the bounty hunter. 159 While police must
have a warrant to enter a defendant's home without consent, the bail
contract gives the bounty hunter the authority to break into a
defendant's home to seize the defendant without a warrant or

convicts); discussion infra Part V (explaining that Washington-based bounty hunter
Ted Oliver served time in a U.K. prison for stabbing his wife).
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 753-54; see also Andrew Berenson, An
155.
Examination of the Rights of American Bounty Hunters to Engage in Extraterritorial
Abductions in Mexico, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 461, 469 (1999).

156.
See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1345 (8th Cir. 1984)
(holding that bounty hunters are not state actors). But see Jackson v. Pantazes, 810
F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that bounty hunters acting in conjunction with police
are state actors). For arguments for and against application of state action theory to
bounty hunters, compare Patrick, supra note 130 (arguing that bounty hunters are not
state actors under three tests for state action: privately-initiated stated-aided activity,
state-regulated private action, and symbiotic relationship) with Drimmer, supra note 4,
at 784-88 (arguing that bounty hunters should be considered state actors because they
satisfy the symbiosis test for state action).
See, e.g., In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. 959, 960 (W.D. Penn. 1898) (recognizing
157.
that the bounty hunter's arrest "is not made by virtue of the process of a court, but is
the exercise of a right arising from the relation between the parties" and that "there is
a fundamental difference between the right of arrest by bail and arrest under
warrant").
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 754.
158.
159. Id. at 770. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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consent. 160 Incriminating evidence discovered during the course of
such an arrest may be seized by the bounty hunter and used against
161
the defendant at trial.
The restrictions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments also do not
apply to bounty hunters. 162 Bounty hunters are not required to
inform defendants of their Miranda rights to silence and counsel
before questioning. 163
Any incriminating statements that a
defendant makes to a bounty hunter can then be used against him at
164
trial.

IV. RESTRICTIONS ON THE ABILITY OF U.S. BOUNTY HUNTERS TO ACT
INTERNATIONALLY
A bounty hunter's authority to re-arrest a fleeing suspect ends at
the U.S. borders. 165 Reese v. United States prohibits bounty hunters
from recapturing defendants who have fled to other nations. 166 If a
bounty hunter violates this prohibition, however, the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine allows U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants
who have been brought before them by unlawful means. 167 The KerFrisbiedoctrine is unlikely to apply in cases of government sponsored
transborder abductions. 168
Several treaties appear to limit the
impact of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, but for reasons that will be
explored, they are unlikely to apply to abductions by bounty
169
hunters.

160.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 770. "In fact, all persons interfering with such
searches can be criminally liable, and bounty hunters can even break into the home of
a third party to arrest a suspect who is inside." Id. See also Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S.
366, 371-72 (1872) (describing the bondsman's and his agent's authority to break into
the home of the defendant to make an arrest).
161.
Drimmer, supra note 4, at 770-71.
162.
Id. at 769-71. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o
person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. In addition, the Sixth Amendment requires that "[iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
163.
See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1345 (8th Cir. 1984)
(reasoning that bounty hunters are not required to give Miranda warnings to
defendants because they are private actors). Patrick, supra note 130, at 177 (noting
that bounty hunters "need not advise fugitives of their Mirandarights").
164.
Rose, 731 F.2d at 1345; see also Drimmer, supra note 4, at 771
(summarizing bounty hunters' broad powers "to break into defendants' homes and take
them into custody, and [to] seize or elicit incriminating evidence and statements that,
whether voluntary or coerced, will be admissible against the defendant in court").
165.
See generally Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. 13 (1869).
166.
Id. at 21.
167.
See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(1952).
168.
See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
169.
See infra Part IV.B.4.
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A. Reese v. United States
In Reese v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear
that a bondsman's or bounty hunter's "power of arrest can only be
exercised within the territory of the United States.' 170 In December
1856, Limantour was indicted in California for falsifying land grants
Reese and Castro became
from the Mexican government. 171
172
The conditions of the bail agreement
Limantour's sureties.
required Limantour to appear at the next regular term of the Circuit
173
Court in San Francisco and at any necessary subsequent term.
Limantour appeared at the next term of the Circuit Court, then
entered into a stipulation with the district attorney that postponed
criminal proceedings until two land cases were decided by the District
Court. 174

The stipulation allowed Limantour to return to Mexico

until decisions were reached in the two cases. 175 Reese and Castro
were not parties to this stipulation, nor were they aware of its
terms. 176 Limantour went back to Mexico and never returned to
California.177

Reese and Castro sued to recover the bail amount that was
forfeited when Limantour failed to appear for trial. 178 The Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Reese and Castro because the government
changed the nature of their obligation without their assent by
agreeing to the stipulation. 179 Furthermore, the government made it
impossible for Reese and Castro to exercise their power to arrest
Limantour because the stipulation allowed him to return to Mexico
and their power to arrest did not extend beyond the territory of the
United States. 180
B. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
Even though the Supreme Court's decision in Reese v. United
States prohibits bounty hunters from exercising their arrest powers
in other countries, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine allows U.S. courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who are arrested in

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Reese, 76 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.

972

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 35.953

violation of Reese.18 ' The Ker-Frisbiedoctrine is based on the cases of
183
Ker v. Illinois18 2 and Frisbie v. Collins.
1. Articulation of the Doctrine: Ker v. Illinois and Frisbie U.Collins
In Ker u. Illinois, Ker was indicted in Illinois on charges of
larceny and embezzlement.' 84 At the time of his indictment, Ker was
known to be in Lima, Peru. 185 Julian was sent to Peru as an agent of
the U.S. government with papers from the U.S. State Department
requesting that the Peruvian government extradite Ker in accordance
with the extradition treaty between the two nations.1 8 6 Instead of
delivering these papers, Julian forcibly kidnapped Ker and brought
him to the United States to face trial.' 87 The Criminal Court of Cook
County exercised personal jurisdiction over Ker and convicted him,
notwithstanding that he appeared before the court as a result of an
illegal abduction.' 88
Ker challenged his conviction under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 9 The Supreme Court held that the Illinois

court did not violate due process by exercising personal jurisdiction
over Ker. 190 The Illinois court complied with the due process
guarantee, even though Ker was present only because of illegal
abduction, because the court used the proper procedures to indict, try,
and convict him:
The "due process of law" here guaranteed is complied with when the
party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the State court,
has a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials,
and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to
which he is lawfully entitled. We do not intend to say that there may
not be proceedings previous to the trial, in regard to which the prisoner
could invoke in some manner the provision of this clause of the
Constitution, but, for mere irregularitiesin the manner in which he may
be brought into custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say

"The Ker-Frisbierule permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
181.
defendant regardless of the illegal manner in which the defendant was brought before
the court. The Ker-Frisbie rule is a modern formulation of the Roman maxim mala
captus bene detentus-an improper capture results in a lawful detention." Timothy D.
Rudy, Did We Treaty Away Ker-Frisbie?,26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 791, 802 (1995).
182. Ker, 119 U.S. at 436.
183.
Frisbie,342 U.S. at 519.
184. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437.
185.
Id. at 438.
186.
Id.
187. Id.
188.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 439-40. The due process clause guarantees that "No State shall...
189.
U.S.
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
190. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440.
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that he should not be tried at all for the crime for which he is charged in
191
a regularindictment.

Ker also argued that his abduction violated the extradition treaty
between the United States and Peru, but the Court held that the
abduction did not violate this treaty because Julian was not acting
192
under the authority of the United States when he abducted Ker.
The Court noted that, under the treaty, Peru could properly request
the United States to extradite Julian for violating Peru's kidnapping
laws. 193 The Court also recognized that Ker had a potential remedy
because he could sue Julian for trespass and
with respect to Julian
194
imprisonment.
false
In Frisbie v. Collins, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the
principle of Ker v. Illinois.195 Collins argued that his murder
conviction should be overturned because he was tried in violation of
due process and the Federal Kidnapping Act. 196 Collins alleged that
he was kidnapped and beaten by Michigan police, who brought him
from Chicago to Michigan to be tried for murder. 19 7 The Court
rejected Collins' argument that his trial and conviction violated due
process and the Federal Kidnapping Act because, under the rule
established in Ker v. Illinois, "the power of a court to try a person for
crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the
court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction."' 198 If Collins'
story were true, his abductors could have been convicted of
kidnapping under the Federal Kidnapping Act. 199 The Court did not
believe, however, that it was reasonable to construe the Federal
Kidnapping Act to prohibit a court from exercising jurisdiction over
an illegally abducted defendant. 200 The Court found that the severe
criminal sanctions available under the Act were sufficient 20to1 deter
this type of abduction without implying additional sanctions.

Id. (emphasis added).
191.
192.
Id. at 442-43.
193.
Id. at 444.
Id.
194.
195.
Frisbie,342 U.S. at 519.
196.
Id. at 520. The Federal Kidnapping Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201
(1994).
197.
See id.
Id. at 522.
198.
199.
Id.
Id. at 522-23. "We think the Act cannot fairly be construed so as to add to
200.
of sanctions detailed a sanction barring a state from prosecuting persons
the list
wrongfully brought to it by its officers." Id. at 523.
Id. at 522-23. Sanctions for violating the Federal Kidnapping Act include
201.
imprisonment for a term of years, life imprisonment, or the death penalty if the
kidnapping results in someone's death. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1994).
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2. Application of Ker-Frisbie to Bounty Hunters: Jaffe v. Smith and
Kear u. Hamilton
The cases of Jaffe v. Smith2 0 2 and Kear v. Hilton2 03 are
illustrative of the application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to
circumstances in which a bounty hunter abducts a defendant in
violation of Reese v. United States.20 4 In August 1980, Jaffe was
arrested in Florida and charged with twenty-eight counts of unlawful
land sale practices.2 0 5 A professional bonding company, Accredited
Surety & Casualty Company, paid Jaffe's bail, which was set at
$137,000.206 After arranging for release on bail, Jaffe left Florida and
returned to his home in Toronto, Canada.20 7 Accredited hired a
bounty hunter named Kear to apprehend Jaffe and return him to
Florida for trial.2 08 Kear crossed the border into Canada, seized Jaffe
in Toronto, and transported him back to the United States for trial in
20 9
Florida.
After being tried and convicted on all counts, Jaffe made an
argument before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that was
similar to Ker's argument in Ker v. Illinois.2 10 Jaffe argued that the
Florida court did not have authority to try him because his presence
before the court resulted from his illegal abduction from Canada,
which violated the extradition treaty between the United States and
Canada. 2 11 The Eleventh Circuit did not agree that Jaffe's abduction
violated the extradition treaty because Jaffe failed to establish
governmental action in violation of the treaty. 2 12 Kear acted in an
The Eleventh Circuit upheld Jaffe's
individual capacity. 213

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211,
212.
213.

Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304 (11th Cir. 1987).
Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
Reese, 76 U.S. at 13.
Jaffe, 825 F.2d at 305.
Id.
Id.
Jaffe, 825 F.2d at 305; Kear, 699 F.2d at 181.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
Jaffe, 825 F.2d at 306; see also Ker, 119 U.S. at 436.
Jaffe, 825 F.2d at 306.
Id. at 307.
The present appeal presents a clear case of individual citizens acting
outside the parameters of a treaty ....

The bondsmen did not purport

to act pursuant to the treaty when they apprehended Jaffe, they
carried no papers pertaining to his extradition nor did they approach
any Canadian official concerning his extradition.
Id. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that two applications for Jaffe's extradition had
been made, but they were both rejected by the Attorney General of Florida because of
errors in form. Id. No further attempts to extradite Jaffe pursuant to the treaty were
made. Id.

20021

INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY HUNTER RIDE-ALONG

21 4
conviction, following Ker v. Illinois.

Unless a defendant can prove that he or she was removed from the
asylum state by governmental action, and therefore establish a treaty
violation, she or he may not object to trial in the United States. In
essence the law is not concerned with the manner in which a defendant
215
finds his or her way into the court.

Because Jaffe failed to establish state action that violated the treaty,
his abduction from Canada did not invalidate the trial court's
jurisdiction over him and his conviction was consistent with due
process.

216

The ramifications of Jaffe's abduction were not limited to his
to
conviction in Florida. Kear v. Hilton dealt with Canada's request 217
have Kear extradited for violation of Canadian kidnapping laws.
The Court had recognized in Ker v. Illinois that one possible remedy
for Julian's abduction of Ker was extradition to Peru to be tried for
violating that country's kidnapping laws. 218 In Kear v. Hilton, the
2 19
Canadian government successfully employed this remedy.
In his appeal before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Kear
argued that he should not be extradited because doing so would
violate the mutuality requirement of the extradition treaty between
the United States and Canada. 220 The mutuality requirement means
that extradition is only available for crimes that are punishable by
the laws of both countries. 22 1 Kear argued there was no mutuality
because it would not violate the Federal Kidnapping Act if a
Canadian bounty hunter entered the United States, seized a bail
The Fourth Circuit
jumper, and returned him to Canada. 222
disagreed:
The rationale advanced, however, depends solely on cases relating to
seizures within the United States for return to appear before a federal
or state court. Those cases are simply inapposite to a situation such as
the one which confronts us, where considerations of sovereignty and the
crossing of an international boundary intervene and there is neither a
superimposed structure like the federal government in its relationship
with the several states nor any full faith and credit clause (Article I,

214.
Id.
215.
Id. (emphasis added).
216.
Id. at 307-08.
217.
See Kear, 699 F.2d at 181.
218.
SeeKer, 119 U.S. at 444.
Kear, 699 F.2d at 183.
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
221.
222.
Id. The court noted that this scenario was unlikely to occur because
Canadian law does not permit "the practice of bonding for compensation." Id. at 184.
Canada still relies on a personal surety system for release pending trial. See id. ("those
who go security for someone being admitted to bail are relatives, friends or
acquaintances acting for non-monetary reasons"). For a discussion of personal sureties,
see supra Part II.A.
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Section 1 of the United States Constitution) and its requirement of aid
and assistance in enforcement of the laws of sister states.
Consequently, we do not accept the contention that [the Federal
Kidnapping Act] would, in contradiction of its plain terms, be held not
to reach bounty-hunting abductions across international boundaries,
223
absent a rule making such abductions legal.

The Fourth Circuit rejected Kear's mutuality defense because a
Canadian bounty hunter who entered the United States, seized a bail
jumper, and brought him back to Canada would be guilty of
Kear was
kidnapping under the Federal Kidnapping Act. 22 4
extradited to Canada where he was subsequently convicted of
225
kidnapping.
3.
Application of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine to State-Sponsored
Kidnapping: United States v. Alvarez-Machain
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Supreme Court
was presented with the issue of whether a state-sponsored abduction
in a country with which the United States had an extradition treaty
divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the defendant. 226 The Court
held that the Ker-Frisbie rule applied and the trial court could
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant under these circumstances,
227
unless the extradition treaty explicitly prohibited such abductions.
Alvarez was indicted for his alleged involvement in the
kidnapping and murder of Drug Enforcement Administration Special
Agent Camarena-Salazar. 228 Alvarez was in Mexico at the time of his
indictment. 229 To secure Alvarez's presence for trial, agents of the
Drug Enforcement Administration paid Mexican contacts $50,000 to
kidnap Alvarez and bring him to the United States.23 0 Alvarez
argued that the trial court could not exercise jurisdiction over him
because he had been abducted in violation of the extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico. 23 1 The Court rejected
Alvarez's argument because the extradition treaty did not explicitly

223.
Id. at 183.
224. Id. at 183-84.
225.
R. v. Kear, 1989 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 6091 (dismissing Kear's appeal from
conviction for kidnapping).
226.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
227.
Id. at 662.
228.
Id. at 657. According to the DEA, "[Alvarez], a medical doctor, participated
in the murder by prolonging Agent Camarena's life so that others could further torture
and interrogate him." Id.
229.
Id.
Id.; United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
•230.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 658.
231.
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prohibit transborder abductions.2 32 Because the abduction did not
violate the extradition treaty, the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine was applicable
and the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over Alvarez without
233
inquiring into how his presence before the court was obtained.
4. Treaties That May Limit the Ker-FrisbieDoctrine
Some scholars have argued that the United States has entered
into international treaties that will limit the impact of the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine in the future. 234 These treaties are not applicable to
international abductions by bounty hunters for two reasons: first, the
treaties are not self-executing and second, bounty hunters are not
23 5
state actors.
a. Transborder Abduction Treaty
In the aftermath of the Alvarez-Machain decision, the
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico was
amended to prohibit transborder abductions. 236
Given this
amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court would likely hold that a statesponsored transborder abduction in Mexico does divest a U.S. court of
jurisdiction over a defendant. 23 7 The Transborder Abduction Treaty
does not apply to abductions by bounty hunters, however, because the
treaty defines transborder abductions in terms of state agents.2 38 A
transborder abduction only occurs under the treaty when an
individual is abducted from one of the nations and transported to the
other "by federal, state or local government officials of the Party to
whose territory the person is taken, or by private individuals acting
under the direction of such individuals." 239
Therefore, the

232.
The Court refused to imply a term in the treaty that would prohibit
transborder abductions. Id. at 668-69.
233.
See id. at 669-70.
234.
See, e.g., Rudy, supra note 181.
235.
See Berenson, supra note 155, at 483-84, 487; see also supraPart III.C.
236.
See Treaty Between the Government of the United Mexican States and the
Government of the United States of America to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, Nov.
23, 1994, U.S.-Mex., reprinted in 5 MICHAEL ABELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU,
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE:

CRIMINAL EXTRADITION (1995)

[hereinafter

Transborder Abduction Treaty]. It should be noted that the Transborder Abduction
Treaty is unlikely to affect the applicability of the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine to abductions in
Mexico because it has not been submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent.
See id.
237.
See discussion of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, supra Part IV.B.3.
238.
See Transborder Abduction Treaty, supra note 236, art. 3, § l(b).
239.
Id; see also Berenson, supra note 155, at 486-87 (recognizing that the treaty
would not apply to abductions by bounty hunters because bounty hunters are not
considered state agents, but arguing that bounty hunters should be considered state
agents and thus subject to the treaty).
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Transborder Abduction Treaty would divest a court of jurisdiction in
cases like Alvarez-Machain where the government participated in the
abduction, but not in cases like Kear where a bounty hunter carried
240
out the abduction without government aid or authorization.
b. The United Nations Charter and the Organization of American
States Charter
The United Nations Charter declares "all members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
241
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State."
Government-sponsored abductions would probably be considered
violations of a nation's territorial integrity and political
independence; again, however, it is unlikely that abductions by
bounty hunters would violate the UN Charter because bounty
hunters are not state actors. 242 Article 17 of the Organization of
American States Charter has a similar provision, which would likely
be violated by government-sponsored abductions, but not by bounty
hunter abductions. 243 Furthermore, federal courts have repeatedly
held that the UN and OAS Charters are not self-executing, which
means that courts cannot apply the treaties until Congress passes
244
implementing legislation.
c. Civil and Political Covenant
The United States is also a party to the Civil and Political
Covenant, which could nullify the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine. 245 Article 9(1)
of the Covenant provides that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are
established by law.

240.

' 246

Also, Article 9(4) declares that "anyone who is

See discussion of Kear v. Hilton, supra Part IV.B.2 and United States v.

Alvarez-Machain, supra Part IV.B.3.
241.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
See discussion supra Part III.C; see also Berenson, supra note 155, at 481,
242.
483 (stating that "it is reasonable to regard American bounty hunters entering Mexico's
territory and abducting Mexican nationals as a force that threatens and violates the
territorial integrity of Mexico," but acknowledging that the prohibition does not apply
to bounty hunters because they are not state actors).
243.
See Berenson, supra note 155, at 481-83.
244.
Id. at 483.
245.
See Rudy, supra note 181, at 797. "If the United States does not forego use
of the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine, or provide an effective remedy for those kidnapped abroad,
then the country will violate its international obligations arising from a major human
rights treaty." Id. at 798.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(1), G.A. Res.
246.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
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deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release
'247
if his detention is not lawful.
The Covenant is unlikely to nullify the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
because Congress has specifically declared that Articles 1 through 27
are not self-executing. 248
It therefore cannot be enforced until
Congress chooses to pass implementing legislation. Even if it were
self-executing, the Covenant would not apply to abductions by bounty
249
hunters because bounty hunters are not state actors.

V. "INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY HUNTER RIDE-ALONG"

In 1998, newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic became
enthralled with U.K.-born bounty hunter Ted Oliver. 25 0 Oliver and
his partner, Ron Mahalko, developed a plan that would capitalize on
25 1
the U.K. fascination with the lifestyle of U.S. bounty hunters.
Their plan was to charge U.K. thrill seekers to accompany them while
25 2
they tracked down bail skippers in the Tacoma, Washington area.
Although Mahalko and Oliver abandoned their plan because of bad
publicity-most of it arising from the discovery that Oliver was a
convicted felon-Mahalko left open the possibility that he might carry
through with the plan on his own at a later time. 253 Even if he does
not, other enterprising bounty hunters may develop similar schemes
for cashing in on the fascination that bounty hunters command.
A. Background Information on the Bounty Hunters
Mahalko and Oliver were partners in a company called National
Fugitive Recovery Bureau until Mahalko learned about Oliver's prior
conviction in the United Kingdom. 25 4 Oliver is an interesting
character, an excellent "poster child" for those who criticize the
reliance on private bounty hunters in the United States. He grew up
in the United Kingdom where bounty hunting is illegal, but in 1989
he found his calling in the United States. 25 5 At the time he conceived

247.
Id. art. 9(4).
248.
See Berenson, supra note 155, at 483-84.
249.
Id.
250.
See, e.g., Modie, All Bets Are Off, supra note 2.
251.
See id.
252.
See id.
253.
Id.
254.
Id.
255.
In a U.K. television program called Cutting Edge, Oliver said, "I had this
dream of going to America to be a bounty hunter ....
I didn't know whether it still
existed, but I wanted to be somebody who tracked armed people." Thomas Sutcliffe,
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of the ride-along program, Oliver was the only Briton to work as a
in
bounty hunter in the United States. 256 He spent part of each year 257
the United Kingdom and claimed dual U.S. and U.K. citizenship. 258
He considered himself to be a modern day Wild West gunslinger,
practicing the art of bounty hunting with a "commando-uniformed,
When he tracked down bail
assault-weapon-wielding style. ' 259
jumpers, Oliver carried an arsenal of weapons, including his ninemillimeter semiautomatic pistol, snub-nose revolver, shotgun,
one fugitive
150,000-volt stun gun, and pepper spray. 260 Oliver killed
26 1
and wounded seven others prior to the ride-along fiasco.
Oliver is also a good example of just how easy it is to become a
bounty hunter. He got his first job with a bonding company after
helping a friend track down a fugitive. 26 2 He became a successful
bounty hunter in the United States in 1989, even though he was not a
U.S. citizen at the time. 263 He continued to be a successful bounty
hunter after serving two years in a U.K. prison for stabbing his
estranged wife thirteen times with a hunting knife in her home in
Luton, England in 1994.264 Both federal and Washington state laws
prohibit convicted felons from carrying a firearm, yet Oliver
possessed a state-issued concealed weapons permit and an alien
265
firearms license despite his overseas conviction.
Mahalko was not motivated by the same Wild West philosophy of
bounty hunting as Oliver; instead, he was a bounty hunter because of

Oliver described the
Television Review, INDEP. (London), Feb. 11, 1997, at 24.
profession as being too exciting to give up: "Once you've done that sort of work, and you
hunt people down with guns, you just can't find a job like it." William Leith,
Television: Monday 10 February, OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 1997, at 83. Apparently, Ernest
Hemingway shared Oliver's sentiments regarding the practice of hunting men: "There
is no hunting like the hunting of a man, and those who have hunted armed men long
enough and liked it never cared for anything else." Drimmer, supra note 4, at 770 n.1
(attributing this quote to Hemingway).
See David Jack, The Lone Stranger!;It's U.S. Bounty Hunter Ted ... All the
256.
Way from Luton; Briton Works as Top U.S. Bounty Hunter, PEOPLE (London), Feb. 2,
1997, at 11 (referring to Oliver as "the only Briton to work in this lethal occupation").
According to Oliver, his English accent saved his life one time when he told a gang that
kidnapped him that he was just a harmless tourist. Id.
See Modie, All Bets Are Off, supra note 2.
257.
258.
See id.
Neil Modie, Bounty Hunters Live by Own Code; Longview Man Dealt Skip
259.
Tracers' FrontierBrand of Justice, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 16, 1998, at Al
[hereinafter Modie, Own Code].
Jack, supra note 256, at 11.
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
See id.
263.
264.
See Modie, All Bets Are Off, supra note 2. Oliver explained that he "lost
control" when he stabbed his wife, but thankfully he said he never lost control when he
was on the job. Tony Purnell, Ted's a Real Son of a Gun; Last Night's View, MIRROR
(London), Feb. 11, 1997, at 5.
265.
Id.
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a sense of social purpose. 26 6 He criticized other bounty hunters for
breaking down doors before knocking. 26 7 Although he had no formal
law enforcement training, he was a police intern in high school. 268
Like Oliver, Mahalko knew what it was like to kill a bail jumper in
self-defense. 269 When he shot a bail jumper behind the wheel of a car
that would have otherwise run him over, police ruled it justifiable
homicide. 270 Mahalko did not approve of ex-convicts being bounty
hunters, so he terminated his partnership with Oliver upon learning
of Oliver's conviction in the United Kingdom. 271 He suggested
publicly that he might carry through with the international ridealong plan on his own after the bad publicity surrounding his ex272
convict ex-partner's involvement died down.
B. Details of the Plan to Bring Paying U.K Tourists on Manhunts
If the bounty hunters had carried through with their plan, the
U.K. tourists would not have been the first non-bounty hunters to tag
along on bounty hunting expeditions. 273 Oliver was actually inspired
with the idea to bring tourists on manhunts while bounty hunting
with some friends who were curious about his occupation. 274. In 1998,
he and Mahalko decided to make the idea a reality by advertising the
"International Bounty Hunter Ride-Along" in gun magazines. 275 The
goal of the program was to expose people from the United Kingdom to
the U.S. practice of using private bounty hunters to track down
fugitives.2 7 6 Mahalko and Oliver planned to charge U.K. thrill

266.
"Why I do it is an issue of the heart. I do it because I care about people."
Sutcliffe, supra note 255, at 11.
267.
"There are guys out there who will kick in a door every time. I'll wait
several minutes before I'll kick in a door." Neil Modie, Tacoma Crime Safari; Bounty
Hunters Set Sights on Tourists for a Ride-Along, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar.
23, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Modie, Tacoma Crime Safari].
268.
Neil Modie, Bounty Hunters Offer British an Action Holiday, Plan to Train
Tourists, Take Them Along on Jobs Draws Skepticism and Outrage, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 29, 1998, at 1A [hereinafter Modie, Action Holiday].
269.
See Purnell, supra note 264.
270.
Id.
271.
See Modie, All Bets Are Off, supra note 2.
272.
See id.
273.
Oliver admitted that their company had already taken curious U.S. citizens
with them to experience a typical day in the life of a bounty hunter. Stephen Farrell,
Holiday with a Bounty Hunter,TIMES (London), Feb. 3, 1998.
274.
He explained, "They said how exciting it was so I just decided to put
something together." See MPs Condemn, supra note 13.
275.
See Michael Thompson-Noel, Have Weapon, Will Travel, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 28, 1998, at 24.
276.
According to Oliver, his goal was "to let people be more aware of what we do
as bounty hunters because most people over here in Britain think this went out with
the Wild West ....
Most don't believe it still goes on." Modie, Action Holiday, supra
note 268. Mahalko agreed that the program could "improve relations internationally
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seekers between $600 and $1800 per person for the privilege of
accompanying them on manhunts. 2 77 They planned to take no more
than two guests on each outing. 278 The program was designed to
target customers in the United Kingdom, but the two bounty hunters
were willing to accept participants from other countries so long as
27 9
they spoke English.
Participants in the "International Bounty Hunter Ride-Along"
program would be provided with bulletproof vests, handcuffs, pepper
spray, stun guns, and, where possible, semi-automatic pistols. 2

80

In

order to use a gun, each tourist would have to secure an alien
firearms license, which would not be a problem in the state of
Washington so long as they entered the country legally and had no
criminal record. 281 Mahalko and Oliver planned to provide the
tourists with training on how to use the weapons, as well as training
in martial arts and breaking down doors.2 8 2 Oliver emphasized that
the tourists had to be prepared to face dangerous criminals who
2 83
might shoot them to avoid being taken to prison.
The bounty hunters did not plan to share any rewards they
28 4
received from bail bondsmen for successfully recapturing fugitives.
Mahalko and Oliver were well aware of the potential liability they
could face if tourists were injured.2 85 To avoid liability, the bounty
hunters would have required the tourists to sign waivers to absolve

and give foreign tourists an opportunity to participate in something they've never done

before." Id.
277.

Id.

278.

Id.

279.
Although targeted at the United Kingdom, the ride-along program also
sparked interest from people in Germany, Australia, Turkey, and Ireland. The English

requirement was for safety; Oliver and Mahalko only spoke English and needed the
tourists to understand commands in the field. See id.
280.
Id. In an interview, Oliver said, "We really need them to carry a gun for
their own safety. When you kick the door in, you never know what is going to happen."
Id. Mahalko was not as enthusiastic about letting the tourists carry guns because of
liability concerns. Id.
281.
Id. Ironically, Oliver might have been unable to participate in his own ridealong program because it was not open to anyone with a felony or misdemeanor
conviction. See Modie, All Bets Are Off, supra note 2.
282.
See id.
283.
"You are in danger. A lot of people are on the run for a reason. They are
guilty and don't want to be caught. Many will put up a battle and some will be
armed... . [The tourists] have got to be prepared, prepared to retaliate with guns."
MPs Condemn, supra note 13.
284. Oliver said, however, that "if participants do something really good then
maybe they will get a reward." Id.
See Vacations: Let's Go Manhunting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998, § 6
285.
(Magazine), at 21.
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them from all liability for injuries that might occur during their
286
fugitive recovery efforts.
C. Criticismof the "InternationalBounty Hunter Ride-Along"
Proposal
Mahalko and Oliver's idea to bring international tourists with
them on bounty hunting missions was widely criticized, but
surprisingly almost none of the criticism focused on whether or not
the planned venture was legal. Curt Benson, a spokesman for the
Pierce County Sheriffs Department, was surprised that foreign
tourists were willing to pay large sums of money and risk their lives
to ride along with bounty hunters when they could ride along with
police for free.2 87 Benson was not aware of any laws that would
prevent the bounty hunters from carrying through with their
plans. 288 He did express concern, however, that the presence of
foreign tourists acting as bounty hunters would be problematic for
police officers arriving at a crime scene. 28 9 Benson speculated that if
the bounty hunters carried through with their plans, it would lead to
290
legislation restricting the powers of bounty hunters.
Criticism of the program was also harsh in the United Kingdom,
especially in Parliament.2 91 Mr. Bruce George, Labour MP for
Walsall South, was critical of the bounty hunters' appeal to the U.K.
fascination with the American West: "I am appalled that British
people are being encouraged to participate in private law enforcement

286. When asked whether clients would be required to sign waivers, the bounty
hunters' U.K. agent, Clive Corner, said with a laugh, "Good heavens, yes.... This is
entirely at their own risk." Id.
287. "I can't imagine that people would want to expose themselves to danger
when there are many police departments that allow citizens to go on ride-alongs, and it
doesn't cost them anything .... But we don't give them a gun." Modie, Tacoma Crime
Safari, supra note 267.
288. See Modie, Action Holiday,supra note 268.
289. Benson said,
"If we get called to a crime scene at ... night, it's one thing to have a bounty
hunter there who may have worked with officers in the past and have some
idea about proper protocol. It's another thing when you're responding and
you've got people on vacation with guns who it may or may not be difficult to
have control over.... The tourists may or may not understand the law and the
language and the procedures that law enforcement here has."
Id.
290. "I can see something like this causing legislation to occur-quickly, and
probably not necessarily to the bounty hunters' benefit." Id. In 1998, bills to regulate
bounty hunters failed in the Washington state legislature. See Neil Modie, Bounty
Hunters Have Carte Blanche in Pursuits;False Arrest Among Consequences, TIMESPICAYUNE, Apr. 19, 1998, at Al.
291.
MPs Condemn, supra note 13.
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in the United States and that they will be encouraged, as well, to
29 2
become latter-day Wyatt Earps and Bat Mastersons."
Mr. Gerry Birmingham, Labour MP for St. Helens South, had
similar concerns: "This is bizarre. I hope British people will have
more sense than to participate. 293 Despite the criticism of the ridealong plan, a spokesman for the Association of British Travel Agents
admitted that he was unaware of any "regulations governing
holidays" that would prohibit the two bounty hunters from selling
2 94
bounty hunter ride-along vacation packages to U.K. tourists.
Even if the plan to bring U.K. tourists with them on manhunts
was completely legal, Mahalko and Oliver needed cooperation from
the bail bondsmen that employed them in order for the plan to work.
Ron Moores, the Tacoma bail bondsman from whom Mahalko and
Oliver got most of their assignments, did not object to U.K. tourists
accompanying the bounty hunters on manhunts: "I'm sure they may
have checked out the legal ramifications. They have their own
'295
business. I can't tell them how to run their business.
The reaction from other bail bondsmen was not so favorable.
Holly Bishop, a bail bondsman and president of the Washington State
Bail Agents Association, was strongly opposed to the idea: "That's a
stupid idea .... They're bringing tourists over here to have a safariin-Africa type of thing? Who's going to be responsible?" 296 Stephen
Kreimer, executive director of the Professional Bail Agents of the
United States, agreed with Bishop: "Are you kidding me? That's a
frightening prospect .... I would hope someone would put a stop to
that."297 R.T. Burton, a bounty hunter who runs a training school for
bounty hunters in Arizona, wrote in a newsletter, "Our industry does
not need this sort of Rambonian-idiot running around with British
298
tourists effecting bail bond arrests."
The critics of "International Bounty Hunter Ride-Along" got their
wish. The bounty hunters were forced to abandon their plan in the
wake of bad publicity. 299 Mahalko terminated his partnership with
Oliver after the news broke that Oliver had spent two years in jail in

292.
Id. George admitted to being "an avid student of the American West, but
[he did not] want British people to become second-class sheriffs and marshalls, and
become involved in an incredibly sensitive issue." Id. He went on to say, "I hope
people are not going to be tempted to America to arrest other people, or even shoot
them, to recover debts. This is horrendous." Id.
293.
Id.
294.
Thompson-Noel, supra note 275.
295.
Modie, Action Holiday, supra note 268. Moores apparently did not think
the tourists would interfere with Mahalko's estimated ninety-eight percent success rate
for capturing fugitives. See id.
296.
Bounty Hunters Should Be Corralled, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar.
24, 1998, at A10.
297.
Modie, Action Holiday, supra note 268.
298.
Modie, Own Code, supra note 259.
299.
Modie, All Bets Are Off, supra note 2.
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the United Kingdom.3 00 The bounty hunters' plan sparked a lot of
controversy and in the end they never took a single tourist along with
them on a bounty-hunting excursion. But the idea is plausible, and
the possibility remains open that Mahalko or another bounty hunter
will try to turn it into a reality. Also, there is a possibility that
Oliver's success will inspire other U.K. citizens to cross the Atlantic to
become bounty hunters for longer than one or two weeks. It is not
clear how-or even if-the scarce laws governing bounty hunters will
prevent these possibilities from occurring.

VI. CONCLUSION: CITIZENSHIP AS A PREREQUISITE FOR BOUNTY
HUNTING
Surprisingly, in the midst of all the criticism resulting from the
ride-along proposal, the question of legality was barely addressed.
The public policy concerns are in many ways the same regardless of
whether bounty hunters bring U.S. or foreign citizens on bounty
hunter vacations. The question of the legality of bounty hunter
vacations in general is therefore most likely to be answered at the
state level because the states are responsible for regulating bounty
hunters. Most states would likely agree that it contravenes public
policy to allow bounty hunters to bring paying tourists-U.S. or
otherwise-along with them on manhunts.
The ride-along proposal, however, highlights another, more
transnational question: whether U.S. law requires bounty hunters
acting in the United States to be U.S. citizens. The fact that Oliver, a
U.K. citizen, has been employed as a bounty hunter in the United
States for several years could indicate that the laws governing bounty
hunters do not prohibit foreign citizens from becoming bounty
hunters in the United States. Alternatively, it could indicate that the
system is not capable of preventing citizens of other countries from
becoming bounty hunters.
A. Given the Absence of Regulations GoverningBounty Hunters, NonU.S. Citizens Could Most Likely Become Bounty Hunters
The bounty hunter's authority to re-arrest a fleeing suspect is
based on the contract between the bondsman and the suspect. The
relationship between the bail bondsman and the bounty hunter is an
agency relationship in which the bondsman delegates to the bounty
hunter his contractual right to re-arrest the suspect.
This
relationship is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v.

300.

See id.
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Taintor.30 1 Taylor does not place limits on who the bondsman can
delegate his contractual re-arrest power to, nor does it require that
agents be U.S. citizens. There is nothing in the reasoning of Taylor
that would prevent a bail bondsman from delegating his re-arrest
power to agents who are citizens of other countries, so long as the
agents exercise the arrest power in accordance with the broad
30 2
guidelines set by Taylor.
Although the case law does not explicitly prohibit non-U.S.
citizens from becoming U.S. bounty hunters, allowing this to happen
may not be a desirable result. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held
that bounty hunters are not state actors, but bounty hunters do serve
an important U.S. criminal justice function. Bounty hunters track
down bail jumpers who would otherwise escape from justice because
police do not have adequate resources or manpower to pursue and
recapture them. For this reason, bounty hunters and the commercial
bail bond industry in general are arguably necessary evils. These
functions should not be performed, however, by curious vacationers
from other countries. Oliver's case gives a clear example of the
difficulties inherent in monitoring the few requirements of a bounty
hunter.3 0 3
Officials in Washington were unaware of Oliver's
conviction in England.30 4 He was issued a firearms permit despite
his felony convictions.30 5 Record keeping-or sharing-between
countries is clearly not equal to the task.
B. Even if it Were Illegal for Non-U.S. Citizens to Act as Bounty
Hunters, the System is Ill-Equipped to Stop Them
Most states leave the responsibility for screening bounty hunters
to the bondsmen who employ them.3 0 6
In most states, selfproclamation and the ability to find a bondsman to hire them are the
only requirements. 30 7 Other U.K. citizens interested in becoming
bounty hunters can self proclaim just as Oliver did. If the law allows
them to obtain alien firearm permits, it is unlikely to prevent them
from using those permits to pursue a job as a bounty hunter.
Oliver's success as a bounty hunter demonstrates how unchecked
bounty hunters truly are. Bounty hunters operate mostly in secrecy.
Bail bondsmen, whose profits are based on bounty hunter success
rates, are primarily responsible for regulation. There is no formal
training requirement for bounty hunters; they learn their trade by

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

See Taylor, 83 U.S. at 366.
See id.
See, e.g., Modie, All Bets Are Off, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 1193-94.
Id. at 1190.
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accompanying other bounty hunters just as Oliver did.
The
bondsman who ultimately became Oliver's first source for bounty
hunting assignments did not object to Oliver tagging along with one
of the bounty hunters the bondsman employed, even though Oliver
was a Briton and not trained as a bounty hunter. As long as bounty
hunters return a high percentage of defendants, bail bondsmen
responsible for monitoring their activity are unlikely to care what
nationality they are.
Furthermore, foreign citizens acting as bounty hunters would be
unlikely to be prosecuted based on the complaint of a defendant they
returned to justice. Defendants abducted by them would be able to
sue for trespass and false imprisonment, but it is doubtful that these
suits would be worthwhile because criminal defendants who have
admittedly skipped town to avoid trial lack financial resources.
As this Note has emphasized, bounty hunters are difficult to
regulate. They operate in secrecy on the edge of the law and are
responsible only to the bondsmen who pay them. If bondsmen are
allowed to delegate their power to re-arrest fugitives to non-U.S.
citizens, the difficulties of regulating bounty hunter behavior become
even more complex. Foreign bounty hunters inspired by Oliver's Wild
West depiction might choose to visit the United States for some
manhunting adventures whenever they need an adrenaline fix and
then return to their home countries. If these bounty hunters violate
the reasonable force guidelines of Taylor v. Taintor or state laws
regulating bounty hunting, prosecutors will be faced with the difficult
task of identifying, locating, and extraditing the bounty hunters to
bring them to justice. For these reasons, curious vacationers should
not be allowed to perform these necessary criminal justice functions.
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